Do expectations matter? The Great Moderation revisited by Fabio Canova & Luca Gambetti
Do expectations matter? The Great Moderation revisited
Fabio Canova, ICREA-UPF, AMeN and CEPR
Luca Gambetti, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and ReCENT ∗
This version, January 2009
Abstract
We examine the role of expectations in the Great Moderation episode. We derive
theoretical restrictions in a New-Keynesian model and test them using measures of ex-
pectations obtained from survey data, the Greenbook and bond markets. Expectations
explain the dynamics of inﬂation and interest rates but their importance is roughly
unchanged over time. Systems with and without expectations display similar reduced
form characteristics. Including or excluding expectations hardly changes the economic
explanation of the Great Moderation. Results are robust to changes in the structure of
the empirical model.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many authors have examined the ”Great Moderation” episode in the US (see Clarida,
et. al. (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Cogley and Sargent (2001) (2005), Stock
and Watson (2002), Gordon (2005) Primiceri (2005), Arias, et. al. (2006), Sims and
Zha (2006), Gambetti et. al. (2008) among others) and its international features are
currently investigated (see Stock and Watson (2004), Canova, et. al. (2007) or Benati
(2008)). Most analyses agree on the observation that the volatility and the persistence of
output and inﬂation declined since the late 1970s but explanations diﬀer. The literature is
mainly divided into two fronts - those who support the ”bad policy” hypothesis (failure of
the Fed to appropriately respond to inﬂation) and those who lean toward the ”bad luck”
hypothesis (shocks are drawn from a time varying distribution) - with a few authors claiming
that changes in the private sector (see e.g. McConnell and Perez Quiroz (2001), Canova
(forthcoming), Campbell and Herkovitz (2006), Gali and Gambetti (2009), Jerman and
Quadrini (2006)) or reduced activism combined with decreased misperceptions (Orphanides
(2004), Orphanides and Williams (2005)) may be responsible for the phenomenon. The
division appears to be linked, in part, to the type of data used (real time vs. historical)
and, in part, to the type of empirical analysis conducted: while narrative and reduced form
approaches consistently point to ”bad policy” as key to explain the facts, structural VARs
favor the ”bad luck” conclusion. Given the strong prior of many commentators, some have
questioned the ability of structural VARs to detect true sources of variations in the data
(see Benati and Surico (2006)).
The most convincing formalization of the ” bad policy” hypothesis appears in Lubik and
Schorfheide (LS) (2004) who, building on the work of Clarida, et. al. (2000), estimate a
three-equations New-Keynesian model with Bayesian methods over subsamples and ﬁnd an
indeterminate equilibrium in the ﬁrst subsample (up to the end of the 1970s) but not in the
second one (from the beginning of 1980s up today). Boivin and Giannoni (2006) conﬁrm
this conclusion with an alternative estimation technique. One important consequence of
this ﬁnding is that expectations were driven by non-fundamental forces in the 1970s, and
became function of fundamental factors when the Fed strengthened the reaction of the
nominal rate to inﬂation. Despite the fact that the dynamics of expectations are crucial to
understand the facts and to assess the credibility of the explanation, no one has formally
examined whether expectations ﬁt the role that the indeterminacy-determinacy story of the
Great Moderation has given to them. Leduc et. al (2007) studied how much the nominal
rate moves in response to expected inﬂation shocks and whether there has been a change
2in the magnitude and the persistence of expected inﬂation shocks, but they do not directly
examine the importance of inﬂation expectations in the two regimes.
In this paper, we study the role of expectations in the Great Moderation episode using
reduced form techniques. To start with we take a simple New-Keynesian model, parame-
terized so as to replicate the most salient aspects of LS estimates, and show that there
is a state variable entering the solution in the indeterminate regime which fails to appear
when the equilibrium is determinate. If expectations play the role of this additional state
variable, they should help to predict other endogenous variables in the indeterminate sam-
ple and there should be a break in the signiﬁcance of predictive tests, as we move from
the indeterminate to the determinate regime. Moreover, omitting expectations from the
empirical model causes the variance of the shocks to be overestimated in the indeterminate
regime but not in the determinate one.
We show that these two implications are the only testable ones the theory imposes
and that existing approaches may be unable to detect regime switches. For example, the
standard counterfactuals conducted in the literature are uninformative because variations
in the policy rule imply changes in both the impact coeﬃcients and the lagged responses
to shocks, regardless of whether policy changes occur within or across regimes. Moreover,
we show that certain structural methods are unlikely to be more informative than reduced
form ones about the type of regime in place because regimes may have dynamics which are
” l o c a l ”t oe a c ho t h e r .
In our analysis we proceed as follows. We collect alternative measures of one year ahead
expectations using survey data (Michigan, Professional, Livingstone), the Greenbook, and
the term structure of nominal interest rates. Then, we run several VARs which include
output growth, inﬂation, the nominal interest rate, and a proxy measure of expectations
and examine: (i) whether the coeﬃcients on lagged expectations are signiﬁcant and whether
their signiﬁcance changes over time; (ii) whether omitting expectations from the estimated
system causes time varying biases in the variance of reduced form shocks. We complement
this statistical evidence analyzing whether the absence of expectations from the estimated
system alters the interpretation of the Great Moderation. Since expectations have been
systematically excluded from empirical models, we want to know whether and how such
an omission matters. Finally, we measure the importance of sunspot shocks and examine
whether their elimination could be responsible for the Great Moderation.
Our results suggest that the role of expectations diﬀers from that postulated by the
indeterminacy-determinacy story. In particular, regardless of the speciﬁcation of the em-
pirical model and the statistics used, we ﬁnd that (i) lags of expectations are either always
3signiﬁcant or always insigniﬁcant and there is no clear switch over time in their importance
in any equation of the system; (ii) reduced form variances estimated in systems with and
without expectations display similar features and little evidence of time varying biases; (iii)
the economic interpretation of the Great Moderation is largely independent of the exclusion
of expectations from the empirical system; (iv) sunspot shocks matter for output growth
and inﬂation volatility and persistence but changes in their contribution over time do not
line up well with the time variations in these statistics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the implications
of the theory. Section 3 describes our expectation measures. Section 4 presents the empirical
evidence. Section 5 discusses the causes of the Great Moderation. Section 6 measures the
importance of sunspot shocks. Section 7 concludes.
2 What does the theory tell us?
2.1 A simple example





t+1 + et (1)
where et = φet−1 + ηt, 0 <φ≤ 1, ηt is iid (0,σ2).a n d ye
t+1 are expectations at t of
yt+1. Suppose expectations are rational, i.e ye
t+1 = Etyt+1.I f |θ| > 1 (the determinate
regime), the solution for yt is yt = θ
θ+φet = φyt−1 + θ
θ+φηt.S i n c eEt−1yt = φyt−1 time t−1
expectations of yt are irrelevant in predicting yt if yt−1 is available. In other words Et−1yt
does not Granger-cause yt in this regime.
When |θ| < 1 (the indeterminate regime), equation (1) can be rewritten, shifting the
t i m ei n d e xb yo n ep e r i o d ,a s
yt = θyt−1 − θet−1 + vt (2)
where vt ≡ yt − Et−1yt.C l e a r l y , i f vt = ηt,t h es o l u t i o nf o ryt still is yt = θ
θ+φet and,
conditional on yt−1, expectations play no role also in this regime. Suppose instead that vt
is a iid (pure sunspot) shock orthogonal to et−1.S i n c eEt−1yt = θyt−1 − θet−1,t i m et − 1
expectations of yt will help to forecast yt,g i v e nyt−1, because they contains information
about et−1 that is not included in yt−1.
This discussion indicates that two basic features distinguish indeterminate from deter-
minate regimes: (i) conditional on yt−1 past expectations should help to predict yt in the
former but not in the latter regime; (ii) excluding expectations from an empirical model
should make prediction errors larger in the indeterminate regime but not in the determinate
4one. These two implications of the theory constitute the null hypotheses of the reduced form
tests we conduct below.
As the editor has pointed out to us, it is unclear whether rational expectations is a
reasonable working assumption when the economy drifts into an indeterminate regime.
Since our empirical analysis may have stronger appeal if the tests we propose have power
when the rational expectation assumption fails hold in this regime, we next examine whether
the implications we emphasize holds under an alternative expectation formation mechanism.
Suppose that expectations are formed using a constant gain learning scheme:
ye
t+1 = ye
t−1 + γ(yt−1 − ye
t−1) (3)








yt−1 + et (4)
Hence, given yt−1, past expectations help forecasting yt,s ol o n ga sγ 6=1 .I n t u i t i v e l y ,
expectations matter because they proxy for lags of yt which are important to characterize
current values of yt.
It is relatively easy to show that the above result holds if, instead of a constant learning
scheme, agents use a Kalman ﬁltering scheme ye
t+1 = ye
t−1 + κt−1 t−1,w h e r eκt−1 is the
time varying gain,  t−1 = yt−1 − yt−1|t−2 is the time t − 1 forecast error and the notation
yt|t−1 indicates the best predictor of yt using information available at t − 1,a n di fm o r e
complicated learning schemes are considered. Nevertheless, as the above derivation clearly
indicates, under learning ye
t−1 will help to predict yt in both regimes. Hence, the basic
tests we perform in section 4 are meaningful if rational expectations hold at least in the
determinate regime - the expectation formation in the indeterminate regime could be any
of the three we have considered.
If one it is not willing to assume that expectations are rational even in the determinate
regime, a weaker version of our tests would be meaningful, provided θ is suﬃciently away
from one. In fact, when γ 6=1 , and again conditional of yt−1, ye
t will have a (much)
larger coeﬃcient under indeterminacy than under determinacy and the diﬀerence will be
signiﬁcant if |θ| >> k > 0,s o m ek. Therefore, even though the distinction across regimes
is not as sharp as under rational expectations, there is a sense in which, under learning,
expectations are more important in an indeterminate regime than a determinate one. The
exercise with a time varying coeﬃcient model we report in section 5, will be able to detect
these diﬀerences if they are present in the data.
52.2 The basic model
To show that the two basic implications we care about, carry over to more interesting setups,
consider a standard three-equation New-Keynesian model, which includes a log-linearized
Euler condition, a log-linearized Phillips curve, and a log-linearized policy rule. In deviation
from a non-stochastic steady state, the equations are:
Rt = φrRt−1 +( 1− φr)(φππt + φx(xt − zt)) + eR,t (5)
πt = βπt+1|t + κ(xt − zt) (6)
xt = xt+1|t − τ(Rt − πt+1|t)+gt (7)
where gt = ρggt−1+eg,t, zt = ρzzt−1+ez,t, xt is the output gap, πt the inﬂation rate, Rt the
nominal rate, and the notation t+1|t denotes conditional expectations. Here, gt is a demand
shifter, zt exogenously shifts the marginal costof production while β,κ,τ,φr,φ π,φ x,ρ g,ρ x,σeR,
σg,σz and ρgz, the contemporaneous correlation between gt and zt, are structural parame-
ters.
Table 1: Model Parameterization
Parameter Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 1
Indeterminate Determinate Estimates 1 Estimates 2
φπ 0.77 2.19 1.75 1.51
φx 0.17 0.30 0.82 0.87
φR 0.60 0.84 0.81 0.86
β 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
τ 1.45−1 1.45−1 1.75−1 1.45−1
κ 0.77 0.77 0.58 0.77
ρg 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.74
ρz 0.82 0.82 0.74 0.77
σg 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.33
σz 1.13 1.13 1.05 1.31
σeR 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.15
ρgz 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
The ﬁrst two columns report the parameters used to characterize the two regimes. The last two columns
report point estimates obtained with a minimum distance estimator using data from the regime 1 (indeter-
minate) but assuming that the equilibrium is determinate. The third column leaves all parameters but β
unrestricted, the last column ﬁxes β, τ and κ.
To describe the population features of this model in diﬀerent regimes we use a para-
meterization similar in spirit to the estimates of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) (see table
61 ,c o l u m n s1a n d2 ) ,w h i c ht h e yo b t a i n e dw i t hU Sd a t aa n dB a y e s i a nm e t h o d so v e rt h e
subsamples (1960:1-1979:2, 1982:4-1997:4). None of the points we make, however, depends
on the exact parameter selection. Note that these two columns diﬀer only in the coeﬃ-
cients of the policy rule, (φπ,φ x,φ R). As in the univariate example, when the reaction of
the nominal rate to inﬂation is weak (φπ < 1) an indeterminate equilibrium is obtained;
when the reaction is strong (φπ > 1), a determinate equilibrium emerges. Since in the
indeterminate regime there is a continuum of solutions, we consider also in this case two
special situations where the forecast error is either a function of the structural errors - the
”continuity” solution - or a pure sunspot shock - the ”orthogonality” solution (see Lubik
and Schorfheide (2003). Also, since the model is suﬃciently complex and no analytical
expression for the solution is available, we present the log-linearized decision rules for the
nominal rate, the inﬂation rate and the output gap the model delivers. The continuity
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where b ζt−1 represents t − 1 expectations of inﬂa t i o no ro fo u t p u to rac o m b i n a t i o no ft h e
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Thus, regardless of the solution one considers, there is an additional state variable under
indeterminacy when sunspots are present 1. Hence, b ζt−1 should help predicting (b Rt,b πt, b xt),
given lags of these variables, in the indeterminate regime but not in the determinate one.
Moreover, omitting b ζt−1 from the estimated equations would cause the variance of the
reduced form shocks to be larger than the true one in the indeterminate but not in the
determinate regime.
1We are not the ﬁrst ones to point out this fact, see Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) or Benati and Surico
(2006), but neither use it to derive testable reduced form restrictions.
7We want to stress that these implications are conditional on the inclusions of lags of the
endogenous variables. Hence, we are not saying that the importance of b ζt−1 should change
unconditionally across regimes, and that the variance of the shocks in the indeterminate
regime is larger than in the determinate one. Unconditionally, several authors have doc-
umented that variables which proxy for b ζt−1 loose their predictive ability for output and
inﬂation after 1984 (see e.g. Campbell (2004)), but these results have little to say about
the implications we care about. Furthermore, the magnitude of the variance of the shocks
in the two regimes depends on the parameterization and the choice of solution. For ex-
ample, two of the three diagonal elements of Σu are larger in the determinate than in the
indeterminate regime under orthogonality. Rather than comparing unconditional variances
across regimes, we emphasize that omission of b ζt−1 should induce biases in the variance of






















































































































Figure 1: Impulse responses, Determinacy and Indeterminacy
We would like to emphasize three additional points. First, the model we consider is
s t a r kb u tt h ec o n c l u s i o n si td e l i v e r sa b o u tr e g i m es w i t c h e sa r et h es a m ea st h o s eo b t a i n e di n
more complex models with additional shocks or frictions. Second, while the structural model
diﬀe r sa c r o s sr e g i m e so n l yi nt h ec o e ﬃcients of the policy equation, the solution is such that
lagged dynamics as well as the variance of the reduced form shocks change. Hence, standard
8reduced form counterfactuals conducted in the literature switching coeﬃcients and variances
across subsamples are not useful to check what regime is in place. Third, changes in the
structural parameters within or across regimes, produce changes in the lagged dynamics
and in the variance parameters and the magnitude of the changes is roughly similar. Thus,
the size of the relative changes in the lagged coeﬃcients and the variances is uninformative
about regime switches.
Figure 1 presents the dynamics in response to the shocks in the two regimes where,
in the case of indeterminacy, we plot both the continuity and the orthogonality solutions.
W h i l et h e r ea r eq u a n t i t a t i v ed i ﬀerences, especially in the impact period, the sign and the
shape of the responses are very similar across regimes.
It is often presumed that structural estimation methods have an edge relative to less
structural ones in detecting regimes, because they take expectation formation into account.
To illustrate the fallacy of such a presumption in our speciﬁc case, we take the population
dynamics generated by the model under indeterminacy (the continuity solution) as given
and ask: are there parameter values which make the dynamics under determinacy ”close”
to those produced under indeterminacy?


























































































Figure 2: Alternative dynamics for regime 1
Figure 2, which uses a formal minimum distance estimator to try to replicate the dy-
namic responses of output, inﬂation and the nominal rate generated by the structural shocks,
9shows that this is indeed possible. If rather than taking one parameterization, we take es-
timated uncertainty seriously and construct response bands for the indeterminate regime
using Monte Carlo simulations, these bands would always include the point estimate of the
responses under determinacy. Thus, even in the unlikely case that a very large number
of observations were available, structural methods focusing on the dynamics induced by
structural shocks will ﬁnd it hard to detect regime switches.
The parameters generating ﬁgure 2 are in the third column of table 1. Note that, it
is impossible to simply change the variance of the shocks to make the dynamics of the
indeterminate and of the determinate solutions close; that is, the ”bad luck” hypothesis
is not local to the indeterminacy/determinacy story. However, alternative explanations in
which private sector parameters change together with the structural variances, or in which
the parameters of the policy rule change together with the structural variance, keeping
private sector parameters ﬁxed (see fourth column of table 1) have this feature. Thus, the
near observational equivalence of various hypotheses makes certain structural estimation
exercises incredible.
Table 2: F-tests, p-values, simulated data
Continuity Solution
sample 60:1-78:460:1-79:460:1-80:460:1-81:479:1-99:480:1-99:481:1-99:482:1-99.4
∆ GDP 0.06 0.04 0.44 0.90 0.60 0.47 0.70 0.65
π 0.08 0.08 0.39 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.40
R 0.53 0.54 0.82 0.22 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.93
Orthogonality Solution
sample 60:1-78:460:1-79:460:1-80:460:1-81:479:1-99:480:1-99:481:1-99:482:1-99.4
∆ GDP 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.22 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.65
π 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.81 0.36 0.39 0.49 0.40
R 0.90 0.90 0.71 0.44 0.84 0.82 0.93 0.93
The table reports the p-value for the F-test that the coeﬃcients on the expectation variable in the
equation are all equal to zero in a 4 variables VAR(2). Data from 1960:1 to 1979:4 are from the indeterminate
solution, data from 1980:1 to 1999:4 from the determinate solution.
It is important to know whether the type of reduced form tests we suggest have reason-
able power to detect regimes in the typical samples used in macroeconomics. As it will be
clear below, we have only about 80 data points on each side of the potential break date,
making small sample problems an issue. To check whether our approach is able to detect
regime breaks in this situation, we have simulated data from each of the two regimes, using
the parameter values reported in the ﬁrst two columns of table 1, employing either the con-
tinuity or the orthogonality solution when generating data from the indeterminate regime.
10We then constructed two samples of 160 data points (one with 80 data from the continuity
regime and 80 from the determinate regime, the other with 80 data from the orthogonality
regime and 80 from the determinate regime), run a VAR(2) including experimental data for
output, inﬂation and the nominal rate and one of the expectational variables, tested the hy-
pothesis that lags of the expectational variables signiﬁcantly enter the ﬁrst three equations
a n dm e a s u r e dt h ed i ﬀerences in the covariance matrix of the reduced form shocks when the
expectational variable is included or excluded from the VAR.
Tables 2 and 3 show that our tests do have power to detect regime changes even in these
relatively small samples. In particular, i) one of the expectational variables is signiﬁcant
in some equations when up to the ﬁrst 80 data points are used but not if either more data
is included or if estimation starts at a later date; and ii) the variance of the reduced form
shocks in a system without inﬂation expectations is larger than in a system which includes
them only if the ﬁrst 80 data points are used. Benati and Surico (2006) have argued that
VARs may be unable to correctly capture regime switches with this DGP. Tables 2 and 3
show that such a claim is generally invalid.
Table 3: Variances of reduced form shocks, simulated data
Continuity solution
sample 60:1-78:460:1-79:460:1-80:460:1-81:479:1-99:480:1-99:481:1-99:482:1-99.4
∆ GDP 3.32 3.22 3.27 3.26 1.05 0.99 0.96 0.89
π 1.63 1.58 1.56 1.54 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.34
R 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.89 1.07 1.11 1.16 1.09
Orthogonality Solution
sample 60:1-78:460:1-79:460:1-80:460:1-81:479:1-99:480:1-99:481:1-99:482:1-99.4
∆ GDP 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.15 0.99 0.93 0.96 0.89
π 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.34
R 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.17 1.08 1.12 1.16 1.09
Without inﬂation expectations, Continuity solution
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:180:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP 3.48 3.40 3.29 3.26 1.05 0.99 0.96 0.89
π 1.68 1.63 1.56 1.54 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.35
R 0.88 0.88 0.83 0.90 1.08 1.11 1.09 1.10
Without inﬂation expectations, Orthogonality solution
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:180:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP 1.04 1.04 1.06 1.12 0.98 0.87 0.93 0.84
π 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.32
R 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.17 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.04
The table reports the variances of the reduced form shocks in a 4 or 3 variables VAR(2). Data from
1960:1 to 1979:4 are from the indeterminate solution, data from 1980:1 to 1999:4 from the determinate
solution.
11In sum, regime changes may be hard to detect with standard methods. However, if
the indeterminacy/determinacy story is correct expected inﬂation, expected output, or a
combination of the two must behave as a state variable up to the end of the 1970s but not
afterward; that is, lags of these variables must help in predicting output, inﬂation, and the
interest rates, given their lags, up to the end of the 1970s but not afterward, and the change
should be a permanent one. Furthermore, omitting expectations from the system should
change the variance of reduced form shocks only for samples up to the end of the 1970s.
Clearly, if the story is correct and expectations are excluded from the empirical system, one
should also expect the interpretation of the Great Moderation to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
In the next sections, we focus attention on the role of inﬂation expectations as a state
variable. Later, we examine how our conclusions change if a measure of output expectations
is used in place or in addition to an inﬂation expectation measure, or if the ﬁrst principal
component of all the available measures of inﬂation and output expectations is used in the
empirical model.
3M e a s u r e s o f e x p e c t a t i o n s
Expectations are not observable but there are proxies one could use. Since they diﬀer in
the time coverage and in their reliability as predictors of future variables, we dedicate this
section to describe their properties and motivate our selection of expectation measures.
The Michigan survey reports average expected changes in consumer prices for the in-
coming year and is available quarterly since 1960:1. This survey has 100 respondents each
period, covers primarily households, and is conducted before the inﬂation ﬁgure of the mid-
dle month of the quarter are available. We assign the forecast to the end of the quarter,
giving the survey a bit more information than it actually has. We use the mean forecast
as our measure, since median estimates are available only since 1978, despite the fact that
Kilian and Inoue (2005) have raised doubts about its reliability.
The Survey of Professional Forecasters, constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, has data on the implicit price deﬂator and real GDP expected yearly changes
since 1970:1 (1968:1 for real GDP growth) while CPI forecasts are available only since 1981.
The number of respondents changes somewhat with the quarter and the year in which the
survey is run, and respondents are primarily members of the business community. As the
Michigan survey, it is conducted in the middle of each quarter, but we assign the reported
value to the end of the quarter. In this case, we use median forecast as our measure.
The Livingstone survey is biannual - it is conducted in April and October since 1955:1
12- and reports eight months ahead level of the non-seasonally adjusted CPI. The number
of respondents is smaller than the other two surveys (it covers about 50 economists from
industry, government and academia per time period) and this may produce larger or more
persistent biases. To make it comparable to the other survey measures, the 8 months
expected rate of change is annualized. The median value is used as our estimate.
The Greenbook contains projections of inﬂation and real GDP growth produced by
the staﬀ at the Federal Reserve Board for FOMC meetings. The projections measure the
annualized quarter-on-quarter changes of the implicit price deﬂation and real GDP up to
1996 and of the chain-weighted indices after that date. One year ahead forecasts are available
only since 1975:1. Irregularly sparsed annualized two and three quarters ahead forecasts are
available since 1968:1 and annualized one quarter ahead forecasts since 1965:4. We ﬁll in
missing data using regression methods and use annualized three quarters ahead projections
as our basic measure. Also, since FOMC meetings are irregularly spaced, quarterly data
are constructed using the projections produced by the report which is closest to the middle
of each quarter. As with survey measures, we assign this value to the end of the quarter.
The term structure of nominal interest rates also provides an implicit measure of in-
ﬂation. To construct it, let ft,p,k−p ≡
Rt,p
Rt,k be the forward rate quoted at t, for p holding
p e r i o d s ,o nab o n dw i t hm a t u r i t yk,w h e r eRt,p and Rt,k are the time t returns on nominal
bonds of p and k maturities. Thus, for example, the (quarterly) forward rate quoted at t,








where the ﬁrst term represents the expected one year real rate, the second the one year
expected inﬂation, the third the nominal term premium (the diﬀerence between the forward
rate and the expected future nominal rate) and the last the real excess return of the expected
nominal rate over the expected real rate. While it is typical to assume that the ﬁrst, the third
and the fourth terms of the expression are time invariant - this would allow us to identify
the dynamics of expected inﬂation with those of the forward rate - such an assumption
is too heroic for the sample we consider to be credible. As an alternative, we use the
rational expectation assumption, regress realized inﬂa t i o no nac o n s t a n ta n dt h ef o r w a r d
rate and take the predicted value as a measure of inﬂation expectations. This procedure is
relatively common in the literature (see e.g. Svensson (1994), or Soderlin (1995)) and makes
the resulting expectations close to actual inﬂation. To take into account potential breaks
in the path of inﬂation the regression is actually run on two separate subsamples (up to
131980:2, after 1980:2). An alternative signal extraction approach, where expected inﬂation
is treated as unobservable random walk while the other components in (4) have stationary
AR(1) dynamics, produces similar results.
Data on the term structure of the nominal interest rates is available at the FRED
databank of the Fed of Saint Louis. However, the data reports rates for non-zero coupon
bonds. We have managed to recover a comparable data set for zero coupon bonds but only
for the period 1974:1-2001:4, which makes it too short for our purposes. It turns out that the
forward rates implied by the two term structures are very similar in the overlapping sample
(contemporaneous correlation 0.98) and the measures of expectations we obtain from the
two diﬀerent series are practically indistinguishable. To maximize the length of the sample,
we therefore work with inﬂation expectations obtained from non-zero coupon bonds, even





















































































Figure 3: Actual and expected inﬂation.
While inﬂation expectations backed out from ﬁnancial market data are probably more
reliable, survey data are publicly available and do not require any statistical model or pos-
sibly controversial assumption to back them out. To compare their properties, we plot in
ﬁgure 3 the time path of the ﬁve expected inﬂation series together with actual inﬂation
computed using the implicit price deﬂator (IPD) and the CPI (measured here by the sea-
14sonally adjusted index for all items). Conﬁrming Merha (2002), Michigan expectations are
a good predictor of actual inﬂation up to 1980. The tracking performance deteriorates
somewhat over the 1980s, and over the 1990s the reported mean systematically overesti-
mates actual inﬂation. Professional expectations are better over the whole sample, but in
particular episodes (for example, the beginning of the 1980s), they are less reliable than
Michigan expectations. Livingstone expectations appear to be free of large or persistent
biases, except perhaps in the latest part of the sample. Greenbook projections closely track
IPD dynamics, are highly correlated with Professional and term structure expectations, and
replicate actual inﬂation well, except for the early 1980s.
Table 4 shows that Michigan and Term structure expectations are those most highly
c o r r e l a t e dw i t ha c t u a li n ﬂation (regardless of whether it is measured by IPD or CPI) and
with each other. In terms of moments of the empirical distribution, Term structure expec-
tations closely replicate those of actual inﬂation. Finally, Michigan expectations have the
smallest in-sample MSE, both relative to IPD and CPI inﬂation. Hence, we initially focus
on Michigan and Term structure expectations in our exercises and use other measures for
robustness checks 2.
Table 4: Statistics and contemporaneous correlations
Correlations Statistics MSE
Professional LivingstoneGreenbookTerm IPDCPI MeanSt. Err. Min Max IPDCPI
Michigan 0.78 0.50 0.77 0.79 0.860.82 4.66 2.20 1.2 12.602.123.48
Professional 0.63 0.88 0.70 0.730.69 4.05 1.97 1.54 9.37 2.335.11
Livingstone 0.54 0.47 0.500.46 4.12 2.66 0.1511.622.976.16
Greenbook 0.60 0.750.71 4.04 2.03 1.4010.601.954.86
Term 0.830.80 3.80 2.20 0.9513.075.519.64
IPD 3.80 2.39 0.9410.99
CPI 4.05 3.06 0.4514.59
The table reports the correlation, some sample statistics (mean, standard error, minimum and maximum)
and the in-sample mean square error. Data from for Michigan expectations is from 1960:1 to 2005:4; data
for Professional expectations is from 1970:1 to 2005:3, data for Livingstone expectations is from 1955:2 to
20005:2, data for Greenbook projections is from 1965:4 to 2005:4; and data for Term structure expectations
2When comparing survey measures to actual inﬂation data one should be aware that they are not mea-
suring the same thing. First, the reported expected rate is an average over quarters rather than an end
of the period measure. Second, apart from Professional forecasts, it is not clear if agents forecast CPI lev-
els/changes or headline CPI level/changes. Third, it is not clear if simple or compounded rates are used to
construct yearly measures. Fourth, forecasts are typically for non-seasonally adjusted data, while seasonally
adjusted data will be used in the exercise. Ang et. al. (2006) have shown that these measurement biases
are small and account for none of their forecasting comparison results.
15is from 1960:1 to 2005:4. IPD is annualized inﬂation computed using the implicit price deﬂator and CPI the
annualized inﬂation computed using all item CPI.
4 The evidence
We estimate a number of reduced form VAR models and examine whether lags of inﬂation
expectations matter in a system including real output growth (∆GDP), the inﬂation rate
(π), and a short term nominal rate (R). Data is from the FRED data bank. Output growth
is measured by the year-to-year change in GDP, inﬂation by the year to year change in CPI,
all items and the interest rate by the Federal funds rate. While the implications we have
d e r i v e di ns e c t i o n2h o l df o ras y s t e mw h e r er e a la c t i v i t yi sp r o x i e db yt h eo u t p u tg a p ,i t
can be easily shown that they also hold when output growth is used.
To start with, we use the traditional device of breaking the sample in two, even if such
approach is problematic for two reasons: since inﬂation and the nominal interest rate display
an inverted U-shaped pattern, it is not clear which break date should be used and whether
a subset of the data (the 1979-1982 period) should be omitted or not; using subsamples
forces a simultaneous break in all the relationships while the moments of these variables
display breaks at diﬀerent dates.
Table 5: F-tests, p-values
With Michigan expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.73 0.70 0.81 0.91 0.70 0.55 0.99 0.92
π 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.05
R 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.05
With term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.69 0.82 0.52 0.29 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.67
π 0.58 0.51 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.24
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02
The table reports the p-value for the F-test that the coeﬃcients on the expectation variable in the
equation are all equal to zero in a 4 variables VAR(4) which includes the growth rate of output ∆ GDP,
inﬂation π, the nominal interest rate R a n da ne x p e c t a t i o np r o x y ,i nv a r i o u ss u b s a m p l e s .
Table 5 reports the p-value of an F-test for the exclusion of lags of inﬂation expecta-
tions in a VAR with 4 lags. When Michigan expectations are employed, lags of inﬂation
expectations are never important in the output growth equation, always important in the
16inﬂation equation and usually important in the nominal rate equation (the exceptions are
the samples 1960:1-1981:2 and 1960:1-1982:1). When term structure expectations are used,
lags of inﬂation expectations are always signiﬁcant in the nominal rate equation; signiﬁcant
in the output growth equation in the samples 1979-2005 and 1980-2005, and signiﬁcant in
the inﬂation equation, if the years 1979-1980-1981 are jointly included.
Table 6, which reports the estimated variance of the VAR residuals when the two proxies
for expectations are used and when inﬂation expectations are excluded from the system,
conﬁrms the outcomes of table 5. For appropriately selected samples, the variances of
reduced form shocks in a system where inﬂation expectations are included decreases over
time and a system which excludes inﬂation expectations has reduced form shocks with
marginally higher variability. More importantly, a system where inﬂation expectations
are excluded displays the same qualitative features as systems which include them: for
appropriately chosen samples, the variance of all shocks declines.
Hence, tables 5 and 6 do not support the main implications of the theory: the data tells
us that if inﬂation expectations matter, they matter for the whole sample and when they
don’t, changes are temporary and primarily related to the Volker experiment of the late
1970s.
Table 6: Variances of reduced form shocks
With Michigan expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.80 0.81 0.86 1.06 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.34
π 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
R 0.50 0.75 1.47 1.96 0.93 0.92 0.46 0.15
With term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.80 0.81 0.83 1.00 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.34
π 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
R 0.43 0.52 1.03 1.35 0.64 0.64 0.46 0.15
Without inﬂation expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.83 0.83 0.88 1.07 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.35
π 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04
R 0.57 0.89 1.65 2.12 1.15 1.06 0.50 0.17
The table reports the variances of reduced form shocks in a VAR(4), which includes the growth rate of
output ∆ GDP, inﬂation π, the nominal interest rate R and in the ﬁrst two panels an expectation proxy, in
various samples.
175 Is the empirical evidence reliable?
There could many reasons for why the empirical evidence fails to conform to the predictions
of the theory. In this section, we examine six alternative possibilities. Tables documenting
the results we discuss are in the appendix available as additional material to the paper.
First, we may be unable to detect a permanent break in the importance of inﬂation
expectations because the lag length of the VAR is misspeciﬁed. Note that, given overlapping
nature of all expectations measures, a generous lag length is needed to whiten VAR residuals.
However, if too many lags are included, lags of other variables could proxy for lags of inﬂation
expectations weakening our tests. Since the model of section 2 has a VAR(2) format and
since inﬂation expectation measures induce an MA component of order three, a lag length
of 4 strikes a balance between the two opposing forces. However, changing the lag length
f r o m2t o8 ,h a sn oe ﬀect on the conclusions we reach.
Second, as we have mentioned, several expectation measures forecast IPD inﬂation
rather than CPI inﬂation. Therefore, we have rerun our tests using IPD inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
VAR. While there is weak evidence that term expectations matter in the right way for
inﬂation, the basic conclusions we have derived hold also in this case.
Third, our tests may fail because the proxies for expected inﬂations we employ are
plagued by measurement or estimation errors. Since Thomas (1999), Merha (2002), and
Ang, et. al. (2006)) have shown that these proxies capture important information about
future developments of inﬂation, it is hard to believe that this is the case. Nevertheless,
Faust and Wright (2006) have shown that Greenbook projections are superior to other
expectation measures, while Leduc et. al. (2007) claim that Livingstone expectations
contain information which is relevant to capture shocks to expectations. We have repeated
the estimation using Greenbook forecasts - in this case the sample starts in 1968:4 - and
Livingstone survey data - in this case data for output growth, inﬂation and the nominal rate
is sampled bi-annually - but the same conclusions. If anything, the evidence for a structural
break is even weaker with Livingstone data, while Greenbook projections become more
important for output growth and inﬂation after 1982.
It is also possible that our inﬂation expectation measures are not really forward looking
making the test weak. To check for this possibility we have constructed an expected inﬂa-
tion measure using the VAR. This measure, which is internally consistent but completely
backward looking, is correlated with survey and term structure measures, but not per-
fectly (roughly 0.6). Therefore, inﬂation expectations measures do contain an independent
forward looking component.
18Fourth, as argued in section 2, the theory implies that there is an additional state
variable under indeterminacy with sunspots. So far we have associated this variable with
inﬂation expectations, but any variable correlated with sunspot shocks may do the job. We
have repeated estimation using output growth expectations in place of, or jointly with, in-
ﬂation expectations or when using the ﬁr s tp r i n c i p a lc o m p o n e n to fa l lo u t p u ta n di n ﬂation
expectation measures in place of inﬂation expectation - since measures of output growth
expectations start only in the mid-late 1960’s, the size of the ﬁrst subsamples is now shorter.
None of the results we have presented is aﬀected by the addition of output growth expec-
tations to the empirical model, or the substitution of inﬂation expectations with output
growth expectations or with the ﬁrst principal component of all expectations.
Campbell (2004) documented that the predictive power of the expectation measures
contained in the Survey for Professional Forecasts (SPF) for output growth has declined
since 1984. As mentioned, SPF can not be used for our purposes because the data starts too
late to make estimation credible. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that our conclusions
are diﬀerent because the exercise we conduct is diﬀerent. First, we are looking for a change
in predictive power of output expectations, once lags of the endogenous variables are used.
Second, we are looking for changes in the predictive power of lagged rather than current
expectations. Tulip (2005) has found that the short term predictability of output growth
has increased using Greenbook forecasts. Our results agree with this evidence.
Fifth, one can argue that a four variable VAR is misspeciﬁed. If a large scale model
were the true data generating process and a four variable system was used, many important
variables would be omitted and their presence in VAR residuals could make the detection of
regime changes hard. We therefore repeated the estimation using a VAR which, in addition
to the previous four variables, includes the ﬁrst principal component obtained from a large
data set composed of 102 quarterly macroeconomic variables (and described in Stock and
Watson (2007)). Two lags are suﬃcient to whiten the residuals of this system. With this
empirical model, the results still hold, except that now Michigan expectations explain output
growth in some samples but not others. However, the change in predictive performance is
neither permanent nor timewise related to the event of interest. Interestingly, inﬂation
expectations have no predictive power for the principal component of this large set of data
in any of the samples we consider.
Finally, we have argued that arbitrarily splitting the sample and forcing the break to
be common to all equations is less than ideal to examine the role of expectations over time.
Time varying coeﬃcient models are particularly suited for our purpose because they avoid
strong restrictions on the nature of the breaks and because they can track the time evolution
19of the relationships. A time-varying coeﬃcients speciﬁcation also allows us to examine the
weaker hypothesis that the importance of expectations has declined as we move from the
1970s to the later part of the sample. The model we consider is
yt = X0
tθt + εt (9)
where yt is a 4 × 1 vector, Xt is a matrix including lags of yt and a constant, θt is a
4(4p +1 )× 1 vector, p is the number of lags and εt ∼ N(0,Σt). We assume that
θt = θt−1 + ut (10)
where ut is a normal 4(4p+1)×1 white noise with zero mean, covariance Ω, and we discard
draws for θt producing diverging paths for yt.L e tΣt = FDtF0,w i t hF a lower triangular
matrix and Dt a diagonal matrix, and let σt be the vector of the diagonal elements of Dt.
We assume:
logσit =l o gσit−1 + ξit (11)
where ξit ∼ N(0,Ξi) and ξit, ut and εt are mutually independent.
We estimate the model with Bayesian techniques and non-informative but proper priors
setting p =2 . The details of the implementation are described in the appendix. Since both
θt and Σt are time varying rather than using classical F-tests for the signiﬁcance of lags of
inﬂation expectations at each date, we present the evolution of the median and of the 68%
central posterior credible interval for the statistics of interest.
Figures 4 and 5, which plot the evolution of the median and the posterior credible
intervals for the lags of inﬂation expectations and for their long run value in each equation,
when Michigan and Term expectations are used, broadly agree with table 5. When Michigan
expectations are used, inﬂation expectations are practically never signiﬁcant in the output
growth equation, and almost always signiﬁcant in the inﬂation equation, at least in the long
run. The signiﬁcance of inﬂation expectations in the interest rate equation depends on the










































































Figure 4: 68 percent posterior intervals for coeﬃcients on lagged inﬂation (Michigan)
expectations.
When Term expectations are used the evidence is more mixed. Nevertheless, it is still
true that the importance of inﬂation expectations in the output growth equation is small
and somewhat increasing since the early 1980s, while for the other two equations the eﬀect is
time varying but inconsistent with the hypothesis of interest. For example, decreases in the
median value of the coeﬃcient of the ﬁr s tl a gi nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ee q u a t i o na r ec o m p e n s a t e d
by increases in the median value of the coeﬃcient of the second lag. Overall, inﬂation
expectations are more important after 1982.
Figure 6, which reports the posterior median of the variance of the reduced form shocks
with inﬂation expectations (Michigan solid line, Term dashed line) and without them (dot-












































































Figure 5: 68 percent posterior intervals for coeﬃcients on lagged inﬂation (Term)
expectations.
For instance, there is a general decline in the variability of the reduced form shocks over
time which is similar in magnitude and timing across measures of inﬂation expectations;
including or excluding inﬂation expectations from the system hardly changes the time path
of the reduced form variances. Furthermore, given the considerable uncertainty associated
with point estimates, diﬀerences in systems with and without inﬂation expectations are
a-posteriori insigniﬁcant at any date in the sample.
To conclude, regardless of the proxies employed, of the speciﬁcation of the VAR and the
horizon where we measure the eﬀect, of whether we allow coeﬃcients to be time varying or
not, and of other speciﬁcation choices, the importance of expectations does not decline as
we move from the 1970s to the end of the sample, neither in the sense of a structural break
nor in the sense of a slow moving but unidirectional change.
















Figure 6: Variances of VAR shocks, solid Michigan expectations, dashed Term
expectations, dotted no expectations.
6 Explaining the Great Moderation
The statistical analysis we have presented is silent about whether the absence of inﬂation
expectations from an empirical model alters our understanding of the Great Moderation
episode. If inﬂation expectations truly mattered up to a certain date, existing analyses,
which systematically exclude them from the empirical system, are likely to be ﬂawed.
To study the sources of the Great Moderation we need to identify structural shocks.
The restrictions we use are in table 7. Gambetti et. al. (2008) showed how they can be
obtained from a DSGE model featuring monopolistic competitive ﬁrms, rational consumers
and rules for monetary and ﬁscal policy, and that they are robust, in the sense that they
23hold as the structural parameters drift within a reasonable range.
Table 7: Identiﬁcation restrictions
GDP π R
Supply/sunspot ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Real Demand ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Monetary ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0
The table reports the restrictions used to identify the shocks in a VAR(2) which includes the growth
rate of output ∆ GDP, inﬂation π, the nominal interest rate R and an expectation proxy. The restrictions
are from Gambetti et al. (2008).
The restrictions in table 7 are satisﬁed in the model of section 2 and robust, not only
to the parameterization of the model, but also to the horizon at which the analysis is
conducted. We impose restrictions at horizons zero and one and collect 500 draws for the
posterior density of the impulse response functions for each year in the sample.
In the introduction we have characterized the ”Great Moderation” phenomena as a
considerable fall in the volatility and the persistence of output growth and inﬂation. We
measure persistence as the height of the structural spectrum of output growth and inﬂation
at frequency zero and volatility as the area under the structural spectrum of the two vari-
ables. These statistics, computed using the median estimates obtained in a four-variable
TVC-VAR(2) when Michigan expectations are used, are reported as continuous lines in
ﬁgure 7. They display two sharp peaks, around 1974 and 1981; a considerable decline af-
ter the second peak; and since 1985, the persistence and the volatility of both output and
inﬂation have been stable and low relative to the 1970s. Figure 7 also presents the indi-
vidual contribution of the three identiﬁed shocks: starred lines represent the contribution
of supply/sunspot shocks, dotted lines the contribution of real demand shocks and dashed
lines the contribution of monetary shocks. These lines report the persistence and volatility
of output growth and inﬂation that would emerge if only one type of structural shocks was
present at each date.
Supply/sunspot and real demand shocks are the largest contributors to both the 1974
and 1981 peaks in the persistence and volatility in output growth. Monetary shocks
contribute little to the 1974 peak, but become more important for the 1981 peak. Sup-
ply/sunspot shocks contribute most to the peaks in inﬂation persistence and volatility in
1974, while monetary shocks are the sole contributor to the 1981 peak - the contributions of
supply/sunspot and real demand shocks consistently decline since 1975 for all the statistics.
Hence, our structural VAR indicates that i) inﬂation volatility (and persistence) would have
24been lower since the mid 1970s, had not been for the Volker experiment and ii) the fall in
inﬂation volatility (and persistence) predates the adoption of a more aggressive monetary
policy stance.










































Figure 7: Contribution of supply (stars), real demand (dotted), and monetary (dashed)
shocks to inﬂation and output growth persistence and volatility.
Would our conclusions change if we exclude inﬂation expectations from the VAR? Figure
8 reports the proportion of inﬂation and output growth volatility and persistence explained
by the three identiﬁed shocks at each date in a TVC-VAR with Michigan expectations
(ﬁrst column), Term expectations (second column) and no expectations (third column).
Our conclusions are unchanged if inﬂation expectations are absent from the system. For
example, both supply and real demand shocks are crucial to characterize the time proﬁle
25of output growth volatility and monetary policy shocks became important to explain the


































































































Figure 8: Share contribution of shocks: star supply shocks, dotted real demand shocks,
dashed monetary shocks; colomn 1 Michigan, colomn 2 term, colomn 3 no expectations.
7 Do sunspot shocks matter?
The analysis of section 6 has not tried to separately identify the contribution of sunspot
shocks to variations in output growth and inﬂation volatility and persistence. One reason
is that, as ﬁgure 1 shows, the dynamics of output, inﬂation and the nominal rate induced
by an orthogonal sunspot shock are qualitatively similar to those induced by a Phillips
curve shock. However, ﬁgure 7 showed that what we called supply/sunspot shock has an
26important role in explaining the volatility and persistence bursts of 1974 and 1981 and that
the time path of the volatility and persistence due to these shocks is declining over time.
Could it be that what we call supply shocks are really shocks to expectations? Could it be
that even if the absence of inﬂation expectations causes minor changes to the interpretation
of the Great Moderation, sunspot shocks matter for output growth and inﬂation volatility
and persistence up to a certain date but not afterwards? Trying to separate the two types of
shocks is diﬃcult in a four variable system. In theory, the real rate responds diﬀerently to the
t w os h o c k s-i tc o n v e r g e st oz e r of r o mb e l o wi nr e s p o n s et os u n s p o ts h o c k sa n df r o ma b o v e
in response to Phillips’ curve shocks (see ﬁgure 1), but changes in the parameterization and
in the model speciﬁcation change the dynamics induced by these shocks.
Conditional on the model and its parameterization, we impose the theoretical shape
restrictions on the real rate implied by the VAR and ask: what is the contribution of
sunspot shocks to the statistics presented in ﬁgure 7? Figure 9 reproduces the combined
eﬀect of supply and sunspot shocks reported in ﬁgure 7 (line with stars) and shows the
contribution of the two components (sunspot dotted, supply dashed) when orthogonality
between structural and sunspot shocks is assumed. Output growth and inﬂation persistence
would have been much lower in the 1970s and the change much more contained if only
sunspot shocks where present. Also, the fall in output growth persistence would have
occurred only since the mid-1980s. Similarly, output growth and inﬂation volatility would
not display the two peaks in 1974 and 1981 had there been only sunspot shocks and the
decline in the 1980s and 1990s would have been minor. One could argue that the truly
important feature here is whether sunspots shocks were present in the 1970s and absent in
the 1980s. Our evidence suggests that sunspot shocks are less important in absolute terms
now than they were in the past. However, relatively speaking, sunspot shocks are more
important than identiﬁed supply shocks now than in the 1970s and this does not square
very well with the indeterminacy/determinacy story the Great Moderation.
We want to stress that the evidence in ﬁgure 9 is suggestive: in a three equation model
it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd sharp implications to extract sunspot shocks and the restrictions on
the real rate we have used are not entirely robust: there are parameter combinations which
imply that sunspot shocks look like demand shocks. These parameterizations, however,
have the disadvantage that sunspot shocks can not be interpreted as stagﬂation shocks.
It is worth contrasting our evidence on sunspots with what is available in the literature.
Leduc et. al. (2007) identify shocks to expectations using delay restrictions and found
that the response of the nominal interest rate is quite diﬀerent in the 1970 and afterwards.
However, the shocks they identify do not induce the same dynamics as the sunspot shocks
27of ﬁgure 1 and this makes the comparison diﬃcult. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and
Boivin and Giannoni (2006) have estimated the model of section 2 with structural methods,
but they do not address the question of how much sunspots matter. Boivin and Giannoni
conduct some counterfactuals but, as indicated in section 2, these are not informative about
regime switches. Also, the conclusions of all three papers are based on subsample analysis,
which, as we have argued, may give a distorted view about the role of sunspots when the
data displays U-shaped patterns.












































Figure 9: Contribution of sunspot (dotted) and supply (dashed) shocks to output and
inﬂation volatility and persistence.
288 Conclusions
This paper examines whether the restrictions imposed by a simple indeterminacy-determinacy
story of the Great Moderation are satisﬁed. We show that there is an additional state
variable in the indeterminate regime which fails to appear in the determinate one; that
standard counterfactuals may have hard time to detect regime changes; and that several
explanations are ”locally” indistinguishable from the indeterminacy-determinacy story. Us-
ing several VAR models, we study whether the signiﬁcance of lagged expectations changes
over time; whether omitting expectations from the estimated system causes time varying
biases in the variance of reduced form shocks; and whether the absence of expectations
alters the interpretation of the Great Moderation.
We ﬁnd that (i) there is no clear switch over time in the importance of lags of expecta-
tions in any equation of the system; (ii) reduced form variances estimated in systems with
and without expectations display similar paths and little evidence of time varying biases;
(iii) the economic interpretation of the Great Moderation episode is roughly independent
of the inclusion or the exclusion of expectations from the system; (iv) the contribution of
sunspot shocks to output growth and inﬂation volatility and persistence over time do not
line up well with the time variations in these statistics.
We show that the empirical results we obtain are robust to a number of potential empir-
ical problems. Therefore, if one insists on taking the bad policy hypothesis as a benchmark,
one has to conclude that the model we have used to derive restrictions is inappropriate.
While the implications we emphasize hold in larger system with additional frictions (such
as habit in consumption or wage stickiness), some omitted features which could matter.
First, if regimes change in a Markov chain fashion and agents are aware of the law of
motion of the switches (as in Davig and Leeper (2007)), the equilibrium is either determinate
or indeterminate for the whole sample but bad policy can contribute to volatility and
persistence bursts even in a globally determinate regime. The fact that i) the role of
expectations is unchanged over time, and ii) the volatility and in the explanatory power of
structural shocks falls over time is consistent with an explanation of the Great Moderation
where the equilibrium is always determinate but bad policy prevailed in the 1970s.
Empirical evidence suggesting that the case for bad policy in the 1970s is overstated
comes from the work of Orphanides and Williams (2005), who ﬁnd little evidence of violation
of the Taylor principle in the 1970s, once real time data are used; and by Duca and Wu
(2007), who pointed out that the presence of regulation-Q made the eﬀective real interest
rate very diﬀerent from the ex-post real rate and that, with the eﬀective rate, the Taylor
29principle is almost never violated in the 1970s.
Second, we have seen that under learning, expectations become a state variable, regard-
less of the monetary regime in place. Therefore, our results are not necessarily inconsistent
with a indeterminate-determinate story were agents learn over time about changes in the
economy (see Schorfheide (2005)). Furthermore, with learning the coeﬃcients of the re-
duced form representation of the model will be time varying - which is what we ﬁnd when
we allow the coeﬃcients to drift over time.
Third, the model assumes that there is no frictions in the ﬂow of information. In models
where information is sticky, such as Mankiw and Reis (2006), the role of inﬂation expecta-
tions does not necessarily change with the regime. Sticky information models, however, have
one counterfactual implication: inﬂation expectations should be almost perfectly correlated
with lagged inﬂation. In our data, the correlation is small.
Hence, while the theoretical restrictions implied by the model of section 2 are rejected, it
is diﬃcult to draw general conclusions about more sophisticated versions of the bad policy
hypothesis which allows for learning, misperception or informational frictions. Future work
in the area needs to examine these situations in more details.
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32Complementary Material
Appendix A: The estimation of the TVC- VAR models
I. Priors
Let zT denote the sequence of z’s up to time T.L e tγ be the vector containing the non-zero
non-one elements of F−1 stacked by rows and Ξ a vector including all the Ξi. The transition
density of the state is assumed to be
p(θt|θt−1,Ω) ∝ I(θt)f(θt|θt−1,Ω)
f(θt|θt−1,Ω)=N(θt−1,Ω)
where I(θt) is an indicator function which discard draws for θt implying explosive paths for
yt. We assume that the hyperparameters and the initial states are independent so that the
joint prior is simply the product of the marginal densities. Following Cogley and Sargent
(2005) we assume:











where ¯ θ and ¯ P are the OLS estimates of the VAR coeﬃcients and their variances obtained
with the initial sample, ¯ Ω = λ ¯ P, T0 is the number of observations in the initial sample
(1960:I-1971:IV, 48 observations), ¯ σi i st h ee s t i m a t eo ft h ev a r i a n c eo ft h er e s i d u a li ne q u a -
tion i obtained using the initial sample. The hyperparameter λ is set to 0.0005 for all the
parameters except for the constant terms of inﬂation, inﬂation expectations and the interest
rate. For these constants it is set to 0.001.
II. Posteriors
To draw realizations from the posterior density we use the Gibbs sampler. Each iteration
is composed of four steps and, under regularity conditions and after a burn-in period, iter-
33ations on these steps produce draws from the joint density.
• Step 1: p(θT|yT,γ,σT,Ξ,Ω)
Conditional on yT,γ,σT,Ξ,Ω, the unrestricted posterior of the states is normal. To
draw from the conditional posterior we employ the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994).
The conditional mean and variance of the terminal state θT is computed using standard
Kalman ﬁlter recursions while for all the other states the following backward recursions are
employed
θt|t+1 = θt|t + Pt|tP−1
t|t+1(θt+1 − θt|t)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tP−1
t+1|tPt|t (12)
where p(θt|θt+1,yT,γ,σT,Ξ,Ω) ∼ N(θt|t+1,P t|t+1).
• Step 2: p(γ|yT,θ T,σT,Ξ,Ω)
Given that σT and yT are known εt is known and since ut is a standard Gaussian white
noise, we have D
−1/2
t F−1εt = ut or D
−1/2
t εt = −D
−1/2
t F∗εt + ut with F∗ = F−1 − I.







σit] and γi is the column vector formed by the non-zero elements
of the ith row of F∗. Given the normal prior, the posterior is γi = N(F1i,V 1i) where
F1i = V0i(V −1
0i γ0i+w0
izi) and V1i =( V −1
0i +w0
iwi)−1 with V0i and γ0i the prior variance and
mean respectively. Drawing for i =2 ,3,4 we obtain a draw for γ.
• Step 3: p(σT|yT,θ T,γ,Ξ,Ω)
The elements of σT are drawn using the univariate algorithm by Jacquier, Polson and
Rossi (2004) along the lines described in Cogley and Sargent (2005) (see Appendix B.2.5
for details).
• Step 4: p(Ξi|yT,θT,γ,σT,Ω), p(Ω|yT,θT,γ,σT,Ξ)
Conditional on yT,θ T,γ,σT and under conjugate priors, all the remaining hyperpara-
meters, can be sampled in a standard way from Inverted Wishart and Inverted Gamma
densities (see Gellman et al., 2001)).
We perform 20000 repetitions, we discard the ﬁrst 5000 draws and, for inference, we
keep one every 10 of the remaining draws to break the autocorrelation of the draws.
34Appendix B: Additional Results
This appendix reports tables with additional material discussed but not reported in
the text. We also present in tables A.15 and A.16 the results obtained using an eight
variable VAR which includes output growth, inﬂation, the nominal rate an expectation
measure and consumption growth, investment growth, hours and the growth rate of money.
Consumption growth is measured by the year-to-year change in real nondurable private
consumption, investment by the year to year change in ﬁxed private investments, hours by
total hours in the non-farm business sector and money growth by the year to year change in
M2. Two lags are suﬃcient to whiten the residuals of this system. In the larger scale VAR
inﬂation expectations have an even smaller predictive role in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h es a m p l e .
Hence, it is harder to ﬁnd a break in the importance of inﬂation expectations over time.
Orphanides (2004) and Orphanides and Williams (2005) have pointed out that policy
decisions are typically taken when preliminary estimates of the relevant quantities are avail-
able while empirical analyses trying to understand how policymakers historically behaved,
typically employ ﬁnal estimates. For our exercises, this is a relevant concern since the
presence of measurement errors could reduce the ability of our tests to detect breaks. To
examine the relevance of this problem we have simulated data from the model assuming
that private agents take decisions using the correct data while the central bank rule is
Rt = φrRt−1 +(1− φr)[φπ(πt + u1t)+φx(xt − zt + u2t)] +eR,t
where u1t and u2t are measurement errors. With the same parameterization we have used
in tables 5 and 6, we have simulated two samples with 160 data points (one with 80 data
from the continuity regime and 80 from the determinate regime, the other with 80 data
from the orthogonality regime and 80 from the determinate regime) and applied our tests
to the simulated data. We have considered two situations: classical iid and highly serially
correlated measurement errors. Clearly, if measurement error is large anything can happen.
Therefore, it is important to appropriately calibrate the variance and the persistence of these
errors to make the simulations realistic. The size of the revision error between initial and
ﬁnal estimates of output growth and inﬂation over the last 40 years shows a small declining
trend and its standard error around this trend never exceeds 10 percent of the standard
error of the actual series. Therefore, it is conservative to assume that an upper bound for
the standard deviations of the two measurement errors is 10 percent of the standard errors
of the largest structural shocks. We ﬁnd that measurement error of both types (see tables
A.17 and A.18) can not cover up structural changes if they were present.




∆ GDP0.44 0.30 0.57 0.81 0.77 0.64 0.71 0.68
π 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.41 0.50
R 0.38 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.25 0.28 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.14
π 0.44 0.52 0.37 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.06




∆ GDP0.49 0.35 0.76 0.85 0.96 0.67 0.90 0.49
π 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.49
R 0.41 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.31 0.26 0.09 0.22 0.15 0.24 0.08 0.12
π 0.50 0.51 0.45 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.04




∆ GDP0.62 0.55 0.95 0.98 0.69 0.72 0.97 0.91
π 0.60 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.08
R 0.16 0.07 0.20 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.02
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.48 0.49 0.14 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.39
π 0.52 0.50 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.27




∆ GDP 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.13 0.16 0.22
π 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
R 0.11 0.10 0.53 0.42 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.05
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP 0.84 0.71 0.14 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.14
π 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.67 0.34
R 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
The table reports the P-value for the F-test that expected inﬂation coeﬃcients in the equation
are all equal to zero in a VAR with 4 variables and varying lags.




∆ GDP1.12 1.11 1.21 1.39 0.79 0.69 0.67 0.52
π 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05
R 0.67 0.89 2.44 2.61 1.42 1.28 0.62 0.23
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP1.12 1.07 1.14 1.33 0.77 0.69 0.62 0.48
π 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
R 0.57 0.71 1.93 2.06 1.18 1.15 0.58 0.21
Without inﬂation expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP1.15 1.14 1.28 1.21 0.81 0.71 0.67 0.53
π 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05




∆ GDP 1.03 1.01 1.17 1.31 0.71 0.65 0.62 0.45
π 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
R 0.62 0.86 2.03 2.33 1.24 1.22 0.51 0.18
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP 1.01 1.00 1.11 1.26 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.44
π 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
R 0.52 0.64 1.78 1.99 1.09 1.11 0.52 0.18
Without inﬂation expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP 1.05 1.04 1.18 1.31 0.71 0.66 0.62 0.46
π 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04




∆ GDP0.92 0.92 1.04 1.20 0.63 0.01 0.58 0.36
π 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
R 0.54 0.81 1.62 1.99 0.96 0.95 0.48 0.16
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.91 0.92 0.97 1.13 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.35
π 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
R 0.45 0.55 1.15 1.50 0.67 0.67 0.48 0.16
Without inﬂation expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.95 0.95 1.05 1.20 0.64 0.61 0.98 0.95
π 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.10




∆ GDP 0.43 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.21
π 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
R 0.26 0.50 1.12 1.21 0.44 0.44 0.20 0.11
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP 0.56 0.59 0.58 0.71 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.20
π 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
R 0.30 0.41 0.72 0.79 0.36 0.35 0.18 0.11
Without inﬂation expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP 0.63 0.67 0.75 0.85 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.25
π 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
R 0.36 0.68 1.30 1.41 0.58 0.54 0.24 0.16
39Table A.3: F-tests, p-values, Using IPD inﬂation
With Michigan expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.65 0.35 0.75 0.82 0.80 0.94 0.93 0.47
π 0.55 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.04 0.20 0.22
R 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.26 0.15 0.11 0.35 0.16 0.49 0.09 0.10
π 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.73 0.77 0.80
R 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00
T h et a b l er e p o r t st h eP - v a l u ef o rt h eF - t e s tt h a te x p e c t e di n ﬂation coeﬃcients in the equation are
all equal to zero in a VAR with 4 variables and varying lags.
Table A.4: Variances of reduced form shocks, using IPD inﬂation
With Michigan expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP1.04 1.03 1.17 1.32 0.71 0.66 0.61 0.44
π 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
R 0.50 0.87 2.15 2.40 1.29 1.26 0.50 0.18
With term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP1.01 1.00 1.12 1.29 0.69 0.65 0.58 0.43
π 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
R 0.46 0.65 1.66 1.83 1.10 1.10 0.51 0.18
Without inﬂation expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:480:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP1.05 1.04 1.18 1.31 0.71 0.66 0.62 0.46
π 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
R 0.63 0.97 2.19 2.46 1.38 1.30 0.55 0.20
40Table A.5: F-tests, p-values, Livingstone expectations
1l a g
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.59 0.77 0.68 0.63 0.29 0.88 0.77 0.51
π 0.49 0.48 0.24 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.84 0.66
R 0.86 0.80 0.79 0.61 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.53
2l a g s
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.63 0.83 0.78 0.82 0.37 0.21 0.18 0.18
π 0.67 0.51 0.42 0.43 0.01 0.20 0.09 0.31
R 0.60 0.83 0.90 0.91 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.30
T h et a b l er e p o r t st h eP - v a l u ef o rt h eF - t e s tt h a te x p e c t e di n ﬂation coeﬃcients in the equation are
all equal to zero in a VAR with 4 variables and varying lags.
Table A.6: Variances of reduced form shocks, Livingstone expectations
1l a g s
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP1.21 1.42 1.47 1.47 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.72
π 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09
R 1.43 2.04 2.21 2.28 1.03 0.62 0.62 0.50
2l a g s
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.80 1.13 1.18 1.19 0.48 0.36 0.37 0.37
π 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
R 1.12 1.75 1.86 2.03 0.81 0.47 0.46 0.40
Without inﬂation expectations, 1 lags
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP1.26 1.44 1.51 1.50 0.88 0.81 0.82 0.72
π 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.09
R 1.44 2.07 2.24 2.34 1.15 0.72 0.66 0.52
Without inﬂation expectations, 2 lags
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.83 1.17 1.22 1.23 0.53 0.39 0.40 0.40
π 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
R 1.15 1.79 1.90 2.08 0.84 0.49 0.49 0.43
41Table A.7: F-tests, p-values, Greenbook expectations
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP0.54 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.82 0.10 0.21 0.10
π 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.39
R 0.71 0.04 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.60 0.12 0.19
T h et a b l er e p o r t st h eP - v a l u ef o rt h eF - t e s tt h a te x p e c t e di n ﬂation coeﬃcients in the equation are
all equal to zero in a VAR with 4 variables and two lags.
Table A.8: Variances of reduced form shocks, Greenbook expectations
With inﬂation expectations
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP0.87 0.84 0.96 1.11 0.79 0.68 0.66 0.47
π 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
R 0.77 1.10 2.73 3.08 1.37 1.33 0.57 0.19
Without inﬂation expectations
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP1.00 1.00 1.21 1.38 0.79 0.73 0.69 0.51
π 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
R 0.78 1.21 2.77 3.12 1.41 1.35 0.60 0.20
42Table A.9: F-tests, p-values, Using output growth expectations
Greenbook forecasts, output and inﬂation expectations
Lags of inﬂation expectations
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP0.57 0.26 0.02 0.00 0.28 0.05 0.21 0.04
π 0.00 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.30
R 0.32 0.06 0.33 0.24 0.59 0.98 0.15 0.09
Lags of output growth expectations
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP0.58 0.71 0.28 0.06 0.02 0.18 0.24 0.13
π 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.49 0.30 0.58 0.32 0.72
R 0.58 0.82 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.69 0.16
Greenbook forecasts, output expectations only
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP0.55 0.72 0.29 0.11 0.06 0.33 0.24 0.29
π 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.20 0.47 0.58 0.54 0.95
R 0.57 0.84 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.57 0.35
Professional forecasts, output and inﬂation expectations
Lags of inﬂation expectations
sample 68:1-79:168:1-80:168:1-81:168:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.48 0.49 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.11
π 0.01 0.05 0.29 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.40
R 0.40 0.64 0.53 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lags of output growth expectations
sample 68:1-79:168:1-80:168:1-81:168:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.22
π 0.13 0.06 0.54 0.33 0.22 0.63 0.80 0.81
R 0.77 0.19 0.60 0.34 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.71
Professional forecasts, output expectations only
sample 68:1-79:168:1-80:168:1-81:168:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.33
π 0.20 0.10 0.48 0.15 0.02 0.31 0.76 0.65
R 0.46 0.19 0.62 0.36 0.07 0.67 0.10 0.18
The table reports the P-value for the F-test that expected output coeﬃcients in the equation are
all equal to zero in a VAR with 4 variables and two lags.
43Table A.10: Variances of reduced form shocks, systems with output growth expectations
Greenbook forecasts, output and inﬂation expectations
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP0.85 0.83 0.92 1.00 0.71 0.65 0.64 0.45
π 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
R 0.75 1.09 2.55 2.72 1.27 1.22 0.56 0.18
Greenbook forecasts, output expectations only
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP0.87 1.21 1.07 1.22 0.74 0.71 0.67 0.49
π 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
R 1.21 1.24 2.66 2.87 1.29 1.22 0.59 0.19
Without expectations
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP1.00 1.00 1.21 1.38 0.79 0.73 0.69 0.51
π 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
R 0.78 1.21 2.77 3.12 1.41 1.35 0.60 0.20
Professional forecasts, output and inﬂation expectations
sample 68:1-79:168:1-80:168:1-81:168:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.60 0.78 0.82 1.07 0.62 0.56 0.55 0.44
π 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
R 0.84 1.01 3.14 3.17 1.15 1.12 0.46 0.27
Professional forecasts, output expectations only
sample 68:1-79:168:1-80:168:1-81:168:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.63 0.81 0.93 1.24 0.74 0.66 0.65 0.46
π 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04
R 0.89 1.04 3.25 3.27 1.33 1.31 0.53 0.30
Without expectations
sample 68:1-79:168:1-80:168:1-81:168:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.94 0.97 1.13 1.43 0.78 0.71 0.67 0.48
π 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
R 0.90 1.09 3.23 3.33 1.40 1.38 0.56 0.31
The table reports the P-value for the F-test that expected output coeﬃcients in the equation are
all equal to zero in a VAR with 4 variables and two lags.
44Table A.11: F-tests, p-values, First principal component of expectations
sample 74:1-79:174:1-80:174:1-81:174:1-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP0.09 0.33 0.43 0.45 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.02
π 0.66 0.05 0.40 0.71 0.02 0.00 0.77 0.78
R 0.53 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.08
The table reports the P-value for the F-test that the ﬁrst principal component of expected inﬂation
coeﬃcients in the equation are all equal to zero in a VAR with 4 variables and two lags.
Table A.12: Variances of reduced form shocks, First pricinpal component of expectations
With expectations
sample 74:1-79:174:1-80:174:1-81:174:1-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP0.83 0.95 1.29 1.59 0.75 0.65 0.60 0.45
π 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
R 0.93 1.36 3.39 4.32 1.23 1.22 0.55 0.18
Without expectations
sample 65:4-79:165:4-80:165:4-81:165:4-82:179:2-01:4 80:2-01:481:2-01:481:2-01.4
∆ GDP1.27 1.11 1.41 1.70 0.79 0.73 0.69 0.51
π 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
R 1.04 1.89 5.03 5.34 1.41 1.35 0.60 0.20
45Table A.13: F-tests, p-values, FAVAR system
With Michigan expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.22 0.05 0.05
π 0.15 0.74 0.49 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03
R 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00
PC 0.04 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.21 0.44 0.49
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.13 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.12
π 0.41 0.34 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.05
R 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.06
PC 0.09 0.95 0.51 0.35 0.64 0.44 0.17 0.42
T h et a b l er e p o r t st h eP - v a l u ef o rt h eF - t e s tt h a te x p e c t e di n ﬂation coeﬃcients in the equation are
all equal to zero in a VAR with 8 variables and two lags.
Table A.14: Variances of reduced form shocks, FAVAR system
With Michigan expectations
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.65 0.64 0.67 0.78 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.33
π 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
R 0.57 0.81 1.62 1.98 1.13 1.11 0.51 0.17
PC 5.49 5.72 6.35 6.27 3.14 2.81 2.80 2.17
With Term structure expectations
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.72 0.71 0.77 0.90 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.34
π 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
R 0.49 0.61 1.54 1.81 1.06 1.08 0.52 0.18
PC 5.38 6.00 6.56 6.50 3.33 2.85 2.74 2.70
Without inﬂation expectations
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.77 0.76 0.81 0.93 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.36
π 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
R 0.59 0.93 1.78 2.13 1.27 1.20 0.55 0.19
PC 5.79 6.01 6.68 6.68 3.36 2.90 2.85 2.75
46Table A.15: F-tests, p-values, Large VAR
With Michigan expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.60 0.15 0.58 0.01 0.41 0.57 0.95 0.90
π 0.94 0.90 0.96 0.71 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.96
∆ C 0.43 0.31 0.50 0.93 0.42 0.30 0.16 0.24
∆ I 0.18 0.14 0.26 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.04
Hours 0.91 0.88 0.75 0.78 0.29 0.22 0.35 0.30
∆ M 0.24 0.33 0.06 0.10 0.59 0.65 0.72 0.89
R 0.21 0.39 0.05 0.08 0.44 0.31 0.48 0.01
With Term structure expectations
sample 60:1-79:260:1-80:260:1-81:260:1-82:279:3-05:4 80:3-05:481:3-05:482:3-05.4
∆ GDP0.60 0.35 0.73 0.39 0.60 0.68 0.83 0.87
π 0.74 0.84 0.43 0.84 0.96 0.68 0.38 0.50
∆ C 0.20 0.58 0.61 0.37 0.07 0.69 0.59 0.53
∆ I 0.33 0.41 0.25 0.73 0.38 0.03 0.19 0.16
Hours 0.92 0.57 0.97 0.99 0.60 0.52 0.59 0.64
∆ M 0.11 0.47 0.85 0.55 0.84 0.51 0.70 0.73
R 0.50 0.33 0.38 0.06 0.19 0.10 0.22 0.19
T h et a b l er e p o r t st h eP - v a l u ef o rt h eF - t e s tt h a te x p e c t e di n ﬂation coeﬃcients in the equation are
all equal to zero in a VAR with 8 variables and two lags.
47Table A.16: Variances of reduced form shocks, Large VAR
With Michigan expectations
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP1.06 1.14 1.20 1.32 0.60 0.58 0.44 0.45
π 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.29
∆ C 0.48 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.21
∆ I 9.09 10.2 11.0 10.6 5.04 4.07 2.95 2.91
Hours 0.40 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.56
∆ M 362.3 371.8 371.7 370.8 142.6 135.1 118.9 112.2
R 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.18
With Term structure expectations
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP0.33 0.46 0.99 1.14 0.63 0.61 0.47 0.47
π 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.29
∆ C 0.59 0.38 0.44 0.60 0.39 0.21 0.21 0.21
∆ I 2.09 6.02 6.78 7.80 5.26 3.91 2.99 2.92
Hours 0.22 0.31 0.44 0.42 0.59 0.55 0.54 0.56
∆ M 128.9 210.9 315.4 306.2 158.9 146.2 127.9 117.6
R 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.16
Without inﬂation expectations
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:1 80:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP1.08 1.21 1.22 1.49 0.61 0.59 0.45 0.45
π 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.30
∆ C 0.50 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.40 0.22 0.22 0.21
∆ I 9.63 10.8 11.5 11.3 5.26 4.25 3.16 3.16
Hours 0.40 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.57
∆ M 380.3 385.3 403.7 395.8 144.3 136.5 119.8 112.5
R 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.18
48Table A.17: F-tests, p-values, Simulated data with measurement error
Continuity Solution, iid errors
sample 60:1-78:460:1-79:460:1-80:460:1-81:479:1-99:4 80:1-99:481:1-99:482:1-99.4
∆ GDP0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.92 0.70
π 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.94 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.32
R 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.26
Orthogonality Solution, iid errors
sample 60:1-78:460:1-79:460:1-80:460:1-81:479:1-99:4 80:1-99:481:1-99:482:1-99.4
∆ GDP0.05 0.05 0.10 0.34 0.74 0.30 0.92 0.70
π 0.36 0.28 0.60 0.05 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.32
R 0.61 0.63 0.82 0.68 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.26
Continuity Solution, AR errors
sample 60:1-78:460:1-79:460:1-80:460:1-81:479:1-99:4 80:1-99:481:1-99:482:1-99.4
∆ GDP0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.92 0.70
π 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.90 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.32
R 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.26
T h et a b l er e p o r t st h eP - v a l u ef o rt h eF - t e s tt h a te x p e c t e di n ﬂation coeﬃcients in the equation are
all equal to zero in a VAR with 4 variables and two lags. Data from 1960:1 to 1979:4 are generated
from the indeterminate solution, data from 1980:1 to 1999:4 are generated from the determinate
solution. When measurement error is serially correlated, the persistence coeﬃcent is set to 0.9.
Table A.18: Variances of reduced form shocks, Simulated data with measurement error
Continuity solution, iid errors
sample 60:1-78:460:1-79:460:1-80:460:1-81:479:1-99:480:1-99:481:1-99:482:1-99.4
∆ GDP 3.47 3.42 3.41 3.31 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.05
π 1.67 1.66 1.72 1.70 1.65 1.64 1.62 1.70
R 1.41 1.41 1.40 1.36 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.12
Orthogonality Solution, iid errors
sample 60:1-78:460:1-79:460:1-80:460:1-81:479:1-99:480:1-99:481:1-99:482:1-99.4
∆ GDP 1.38 1.40 1.72 1.69 0.50 0.13 0.05 0.05
π 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.30 1.57 1.64 1.62 1.70
R 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.53 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.12
Without inﬂation expectations, Continuity solution, iid errors
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:180:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP 3.82 3.74 3.58 3.44 0.19 0.08 0.05 0.05
π 1.72 1.71 1.76 1.70 1.69 1.68 1.65 1.73
R 1.49 1.48 1.45 1.39 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.12
Without inﬂation expectations, Orthogonality solution, iid errors
sample 55:1-79:155:1-80:155:1-81:155:1-82:179:2-06:180:2-06:181:2-06:181:2-06.1
∆ GDP 1.35 1.37 1.66 1.61 0.47 0.12 0.05 0.05
π 0.18 0.18 0.29 0.27 1.57 1.64 1.61 1.67
R 0.53 0.52 0.56 0.54 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.11
49